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Abstract We use experimental data to analyze consumption decisions by groups
of individuals who have to reach a consensus on spending a joint budget. Our
experiment involves dyads (i.e. two-member groups) who have to compose con-
sumption bundles consisting of three commodities (wine, orange juice and M&Ms).
We focus on the collective consumption model to describe group behavior. This
model represents group decisions as Pareto optimal outcomes of a within-group
bargaining process, with rational group members who are each characterized by
individual bargaining weights. We also consider specifications of the collective
model that restrict the variation of these bargaining weights. A distinguishing fea-
ture of our study is that we use revealed preference testing tools to assess the
goodness-of-fit and discriminatory power of alternative specifications of the col-
lective model. Our experimental results suggest that the most appropriate model
specification allows for a limited variation of the bargaining weights.
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1 Introduction
We consider the empirical analysis of consumption decisions by groups of
individuals who have to reach a consensus on spending a joint budget. A most
notable example of such a group is the household of which the members pool their
income, after which they must agree upon the allocation of this aggregate income.
Samuelson (1956) initiated this consensual approach to modeling household
consumption behavior, by assuming a (household level) social welfare function that
is maximized under a household budget constraint (see also Donni 2007a; Lundberg
and Pollak 2007 for recent surveys of the literature following this approach).1
This paper deals with individual consumption in a multi-person group and is
framed in terms of the collective consumption model introduced by Chiappori
(1988). This model assumes a collective choice process and explicitly recognizes
the multi-person nature of this process, with each individual decision maker (group
member) characterized by an own utility function that represents her/his rational
preferences.2 It only assumes that the observed group consumption is the Pareto
efficient outcome of a bargaining process.3 The model then defines collectively
rational behavior as maximizing a weighted sum of the group member utility
functions, with the weights representing the bargaining power of the individual
group members. Interestingly, these bargaining weights may vary depending on the
prices, income levels and other exogenous variables characterizing the choice
situations.4 The collective model is increasingly used in empirical studies of
household behavior (see, for example, Vermeulen 2002; Donni 2007b for surveys).
1 In this respect, it is worth pointing out that alternative approaches to modeling household behavior have
been suggested in the literature. For example, Grossbard-Shechtman (1984, 2003) and Grossbard (2010)
assume individuals who independently maximize their own utility functions under individual budget and
participation constraints. Still, in our experimental design respondents face (only) a joint budget constraint
(see Sect. 3). Therefore, our principal focus will be on the consensual approach in what follows.
2 This explicit recognition of individual preferences falls in line with the growing consensus that multi-person
household consumption behavior should no longer be treated as if the household were a single decision maker
(optimizing a household utility function subject to a household budget constraint). Indeed, this so-called
unitary model of household consumption imposes empirically testable restrictions on the household demand
function (e.g. Slutsky symmetry) that are frequently rejected when confronted with consumption or labor
supply data (see, for example, Thomas 1990; Browning and Chiappori 1998; Duflo 2003; Cherchye et al. 2009)
for empirical evidence based on consumption data, and Lundberg 1988; Fortin and Lacroix 1997; Chiappori
et al. 2002; Cherchye and Vermeulen 2008 for evidence based on labor supply data).
3 Pareto efficiency is a minimal assumption in the consensual approach to modeling group consumption
behavior. Apps and Rees (1988, 2009) propose a household consumption model, which is formally
similar to Chiappori’s model, based on the same Pareto efficiency assumption.
4 These variables are usually referred to as distribution factors (see, for example, Browning et al. 2006
for an extensive discussion). They have also been termed market forces (Becker 1973) and extra
environmental parameters (McElroy and Horney 1981).
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We make an empirical as well as a methodological contribution. The empirical
contribution is that we apply a revealed preference methodology in combination
with experimental data for assessing the empirical goodness-of-fit of the collective
model. More specifically, we will focus on revealed preference conditions in the
tradition of Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982). These conditions
enable checking consistency of a given data set with a particular specification of the
collective consumption model. In the spirit of Varian (1982), we will refer to this
checking procedure as ‘testing’ data consistency with collective rationality. Apart
from goodness-of-fit, we will also consider the discriminatory power of alternative
specifications of the collective consumption model. Indeed, a fair comparison of
different behavioral models must complement a goodness-of-fit analysis with a
power analysis: favorable goodness-of-fit results, indicating few violations of the
behavioral restrictions, have little meaning if the behavioral implications have low
power, i.e. optimizing behavior can hardly be rejected.
Our use of revealed preference tests and experimental data distinguishes our
empirical study from existing studies. Revealed preference tests are entirely
nonparametric, which means that they do not require a prior parametric structure for
the consumption model (e.g. individual utility functions). This contrasts with other
studies, which are typically parametric in nature. Strictly speaking, these studies
simultaneously test the consumption model under study as well as a (non-verifiable)
parametric structure that is imposed on the model. The use of nonparametric tools
does not require such a priori’s. In addition, the laboratory nature of experiments
effectively avoids the often controversial preference homogeneity assumptions
(excluding e.g. changing preferences) and data measurement problems that are
associated with using ‘real life’ data. In fact, it has been argued that revealed
preference testing tools are especially useful within an experimental context; a
particularly convincing case is provided by Sippel (1997), who focused on
individual rationality. Next, and specific for our own study, the experimental set-up
allows for obtaining information on consumption quantities for the individual group
members; such information is typically not available in ‘real life’ data sets. For
example, household data sets usually only contain consumption quantity informa-
tion at the level of the aggregate household as a whole, and do not reveal the
individual members’ consumption quantities. In this respect, we also refer to our
discussion in Sect. 4, which discusses the relevance of this study for analyzing
household consumption data.
As for our methodological contribution, we present testing tools for collective
rationality under alternative assumptions regarding variation of bargaining weights
across different choice situations. This extends earlier work of Cherchye et al.
(2007, 2011), who developed revealed preference conditions for the collective
consumption model that do not include such assumptions. As such, these conditions
allow for a huge variation of the bargaining weights across periods. For example,
the model allows the full bargaining power to shift from one group member to
another between any two consecutive periods. Because the realistic nature of such
power shifts may be questioned, we propose a revealed preference methodology for
testing the collective consumption model under restricted variation of bargaining
weights. As we will indicate, adding such weight restrictions implies revealed
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preference tests with higher discriminatory power, which is particularly convenient
when focusing on the empirical performance of the collective model.
At this point, it is worth to distinguish our approach from the one of Cherchye
et al. (2009). These authors suggest revealed preference conditions for the collective
consumption model that impose prior assumptions regarding the so-called sharing
rule (or within-group income distribution) underlying observed household behavior.
This sharing rule is often interpreted as an indicator of bargaining power (see, for
example, Browning et al. 2006). As such, the approach presented here can be
conceived as complementary with the one proposed by Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen.5
One final remark applies to our following empirical analysis. The revealed
preference tests on which we focus are not traditional statistical tests, which are
characterized by standard errors and so allow for statistical inference. Our tests are
‘sharp’ tests: they check whether or not the data pass the revealed preference
conditions exactly. If the data do not pass the conditions, then the model under study
is rejected.6 As a result, we cannot use the usual statistical methods for comparing
the empirical validity of different specifications of the collective model. By contrast,
we will follow a recent proposal of Beatty and Crawford (2011) that compares
different behavioral models on the basis of a so-called ‘predictive success’ measure,
which is specially tailored for the type of revealed preference tests that we consider
here. As we will explain in Sect. 4, this measure of predictive success
simultaneously accounts for the goodness-of-fit and discriminatory power of a
particular model specification.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 introduces the revealed
preference tests for collective rationality. Section 3 presents the experimental
design. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis, and subsequently
discusses the usefulness of this study for analyzing household consumption data.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Rational consumption decisions: revealed preference conditions
In this section we present the rationality conditions for consumption behavior that
will be used in our empirical study. To set the stage, we first introduce the unitary
rationality condition, which we will also use for evaluating the individual choices in
our experimental analysis. Next, we consider two versions of collective rationality,
i.e. with and without restrictions on the variation of the bargaining weights across
choice observations.
5 For example, it may well be that the distribution of the bargaining power varies while the within-group
income distribution remains constant, and vice versa. Example 1 in Sect. 2.3 will provide a specific
illustration of this point.
6 Varian (1990) provides a detailed discussion on the difference between revealed preference tests and
traditional statistical tests.
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2.1 Unitary rationality
Our empirical analysis starts from a finite set of T observed choices consisting of
N-vectors of quantities qt 2 RNþ and prices pt 2 RNþþ: Let
Sun ¼ pt; qtð Þ; t ¼ 1; . . .; Tf g
represent the corresponding set of observations that is used in the analysis of unitary
rationality.
Given the set Sun, unitary rationality means that observed behavior can be
rationalized in terms of a single decision maker maximizing a single (‘unitary’)
utility function U. Throughout, we will assume utility functions are continuous,
concave, monotonically increasing and non-satiated. Formally, we get the following
condition for unitary rationality:
Definition 1 (unitary rationalization, UR) Let Sun ¼ pt; qtð Þ; t ¼ 1; . . .; Tf g be a
set of observations. A utility function U provides a unitary rationalization (UR) of
Sun if and only if for each observation t ¼ 1; . . .; T : U qtð Þ equals
max
z2Rnþ
U zð Þ s.t. p0tz p0tqt; ð1Þ
with z representing affordable consumption quantities for the prices pt and budget
p0tqt:
Varian (1982), based on Afriat (1967), has demonstrated that such a data
rationalizing utility function exists if and only if a solution exists for the so-called
Afriat inequalities. This is contained in the next result:
Proposition 1 Let Sun ¼ pt; qtð Þ; t ¼ 1; . . .; Tf g be a set of observations. The
following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a utility function U that provides a UR of Sun;
(ii) For all s; t 2 f1; . . .; Tg; there exist numbers Ut; kt 2 Rþþ that meet the Afriat
inequalities
Us  Ut  ktp0t qs  qtð Þ: ð2Þ
In this result, the equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) means that there
exists a rationalizing utility function U if and only if the set Sun satisfies a number of
inequalities defined in the unknowns Ut and kt. These last inequalities are commonly
referred to as ‘Afriat inequalities’ corresponding to the set Sun. Intuitively, these
Afriat inequalities allow us to obtain an explicit construction of the utility levels and
the marginal utility of income associated with each observation t: they define a
utility level Ut and a marginal utility of income kt (associated with the observed
income p0tqt) for each observed qt: We remark that the Afriat inequalities in (2) are
linear. Thus, we can use standard linear programming techniques to verify if there
exists a unitary rationalization for S.
In what follows, we will consider an extended version of the rationality condition
in Proposition 1. The extended condition accounts for optimization errors in the
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following way: it requires ‘nearly’ optimizing behavior rather than ‘exactly’
optimizing behavior (see Afriat 1973; Varian 1990 on the usefulness of considering
such nearly optimizing behavior in empirical revealed preference analysis).
Formally, the extended version of the rationality condition uses e 2 ½0; 1; and
replaces (2) by
Us  Ut  ktp0t qs  eqtð Þ: ð3Þ
Clearly, e = 1 makes (3) coincide with (2). In our following empirical exercise, we
allow for small optimization errors by additionally considering e = 0.975 and
e = 0.95. In general, lower values for e imply weaker unitary rationality conditions.
We remark that using (3) instead of (2) preserves the linear nature of the restrictions.
2.2 Collective rationality without bargaining weight restrictions
Our empirical investigation of the collective consumption model will focus on two-
member groups or ‘dyads’. Like above, we assume an observed set of T dyad
choices, consisting of quantities qt and prices pt: Now we also use information on
the observed within-dyad allocation of the quantities qt; our experimental set-up
allows us to obtain this information (see Sect. 3) Specifically, for each observed




t 2 RNþ such that
qt¼ q1t þ q2t ; ð4Þ
Thus, our analysis of collective rationality will use the set of observations
Sco ¼ pt; qt; q1t ; q2t
 
; t ¼ 1; . . .; T 
The collective model assumes that the preferences of the two group members,
which are defined in terms of the privately consumed quantities, can be represented
by utility functions U1 and U2. The collective consumption model (only) assumes
Pareto efficient within-group allocations. Formally, we obtain the following
condition for collective rationality.
Definition 2 (collective rationalization, CR) Let Sco ¼ f pt; qt; q1t ; q2t
 
; t ¼
1; . . .; Tg be a set of observations. A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a
collective rationalization (CR) of Sco if and only if for each observation t ¼ 1; . . .; T :
there exists a Pareto weight lt 2 Rþþ such that U1 q1t




z1; z2ð Þ2 Rnþð Þ2
U1 z1
 þ ltU2 z2
 
s:t: p0t z
1 þ z2  p0tqt; ð5Þ
with z1 and z2 representing affordable consumption quantities for the prices pt and
budget p0tqt:
Thus, the collective consumption model generalizes the unitary model by
describing group behavior as maximizing a weighted sum of the individual member
utilities. The Pareto weight lt then represents the relative ‘bargaining power’ of
member 2 (vis-a`-vis member 1) in observation/situation t. Importantly, this
bargaining power may vary depending on the specific observation at hand.
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The following result provides a revealed preference characterization of
collectively rational behavior.
Proposition 2 Let Sco ¼ pt; qt; q1t ; q2t
 
; t ¼ 1; . . .; T  be a set of observations.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a CR of Sco;
(ii) For all s; t 2 f1; . . .; Tg; m ¼ 1; 2 there exist numbers Umt ; kmt 2 Rþþ that meet
the collective Afriat inequalities
Ums  Umt  kmt p0t qms  qmt
 
: ð6Þ
The interpretation of statement (ii) in this result is similar to the one of statement
(ii) in Proposition 1. Just like for individual rationality, collective rationality
requires finding a solution for Afriat inequalities. In this case, we get a set of
inequalities for each individual member defined in terms of the given personalized
quantities and prices. Like before, they allow for an explicit construction of (in casu
member-specific) utilities (Ut
m) and marginal utilities of income (kt
m). In the
collective case, the marginal utilities of income pertain to the income shares of the
individual group members associated with the observed intragroup allocation (i.e.
p0tq
m
t for each member m).
Similar to before, our following experimental analysis will focus on an extended
version of the inequalities (6) that accounts for optimization error, i.e.
Ums  Umt  ktp0t qms  eqmt
  ð7Þ
with e = 1, 0.975 and 0.95. The resulting inequalities can again be verified through
linear programming techniques.
Two final remarks are in order. Firstly, the above collective consumption model
is the so-called egoistic model, in which each member m’s utility function only
depends on the own private consumption qm: This means that we do not allow (i) for
consumption externalities (i.e. Um does not depend on ql; l 6¼ m) or (ii) public
consumption within the group. Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and
Ekeland (2006, 2009) introduced a general collective consumption model that does
account for publicly consumed quantities and privately consumed quantities
associated with externalities; Cherchye et al. (2007, 2011) developed the revealed
preference condition for this general model. We see more refined experiments that
specifically focus on consumption externalities and publicly consumed quantities as
an interesting avenue for future research. However, we also believe that a simple
experiment that focuses on the egoistic model constitutes a useful first step towards
considering such more refined settings.
At this point, it is worth indicating that this ‘egoistic’ specification of the
collective model actually encompasses a wider class of member-specific utilities,
which model altruism in a specific way: it also includes so-called caring preferences
of the individual group members, which depend not only on the member’s own
(egoistic) utility but also on the other member’s utility. Chiappori (1992) argues that
the empirical implications of caring preferences are indistinguishable from those of
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egoistic preferences. As such, while we will not indicate this explicitly in the
following discussion, our empirical conclusions for the egoistic model directly carry
over to the (more general) caring model.
A second remark pertains to our maintained assumption that individual utility
functions are concave (representing convex preferences). In this respect, Cherchye
et al. (2010a) have recently shown that this concavity assumption is actually
testable for the egoistic model that we consider here. They established a testable
revealed preference condition for the model that applies under general (possibly
non-convex) preferences. If we apply this condition to the experimental data
presented in Sect. 4, then we conclude that this last condition cannot be rejected for
our dyads under study.7 In other words, the egoistic model cannot be rejected if we
allow for non-concave utility functions. Or conversely, any rejection of the egoistic
model that is reported further on may also be attributed to non-convex individual
preferences rather than a rejection of the egoistic model per se.
In this study, we maintain the assumption of concave utilities because it allows us
to represent Pareto efficient group behavior as maximizing a weighted sum of
individual utilities, with the Pareto weights lt indicating the relative bargaining
power of the individual group members (see Definition 2). This representation no
longer holds if we drop the concavity assumption. As a matter of fact, this weighted
sum representation forms the very basis for our methodological contribution that we
present next, which develops a revealed preference characterization of collectively
rational behavior under restricted Pareto weights lt.
2.3 Collective rationality under bargaining weight restrictions
The collective rationality condition discussed above does not impose any restriction
on the bargaining weights in different choice situations/observations. If this
condition cannot be rejected for a given set of observations, a natural next question
asks whether the data also pass a more restricted condition that does impose
restrictions on the bargaining weights variation. In this section, we propose a
methodology that allows for testing such a condition.
Formally, we consider the following condition of collective rationality under
bargaining weight restrictions.
Definition 3 (restricted collective rationalization, a - CR) Let Sco ¼
fðpt; qt; q1t ; q2t Þ; t ¼ 1; . . .; Tg be a set of observations and consider a 2 Rþ: A pair
of utility functions U1 and U2 provides an a-restricted collective rationalization
(a - CR) of Sco if and only if for each observation t ¼ 1; . . .; T : there exists a
constant C 2 Rþ and weights lt 2 Rþþ such that U1 q1t
 þ ltU2 q2t
 
equals
7 For compactness, we do not include these results here. But they are available from the authors upon
request.
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max
z1;z2ð Þ2 Rnþð Þ2
U1 z1
 þ ltU2 z2
 
s:t: p0t z
1 þ z2  p0tqt
and
C
ð1 þ aÞ  lt Cð1 þ aÞ;
ð8Þ
with z1 and z2 representing affordable consumption quantities for the prices pt and
budget p0tqt:
The only difference with Definition 2 is the additional restriction (8) on the
bargaining weights lt. In the limiting case when a = 0, Definition 3 constraints the
bargaining weight to be a constant number C for all observations. For other choices
of a, the definition allows for some variation of lt, but only in a prespecified (small)
range. Finally, taking a arbitrarily large makes Definitions 2 and 3 coincide. As
such, Definition 3 allows us to consider a whole spectrum of collective consumption
models.
The following proposition presents a revealed preference characterization of
collectively rationality under bargaining weight restrictions.8
Proposition 3 Let Sco ¼ pt; qt; q1t ; q2t
 
; t ¼ 1; . . .; T  be a set of observations
and consider a 2 Rþ: The following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that provide an a-CR of Sco;
(ii) For all s; t 2 f1; . . .; Tg; m ¼ 1; 2 there exist numbers Umt ; kmt 2 Rþþ that meet
the collective Afriat inequalities




ð1 þ aÞ 
k1t
k2t
ð1 þ aÞ: ð10Þ
The interpretation of the condition in Proposition 3 is directly analogous to the
one of Proposition 2. The only difference is the additional restriction (10), which
corresponds to the weight restriction (8) in Definition 3. We note that the restriction
(10) can be rewritten in linear form as
k2t ð1 þ aÞk1t and
k1t ð1 þ aÞk2t :
Thus, we can again use linear programming techniques to verify the a - CR
condition in Proposition 3.
In our following analysis, the unitary model will serve as a benchmark when
evaluating the goodness-of-fit of various collective models. In this respect, it is
important to point out that the a-CR condition in Proposition 3 (for any value of a) is
not nested with unitary rationality condition in Proposition 1: consistency with the
first condition does not imply consistency with the second condition, or vice versa.
8 Like before, we will replace (9) by (7) to account for optimization error in our empirical exercises.
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In our opinion, this nonnestedness conclusion makes it all the more interesting to
empirically compare the empirical performance of the unitary model and the
collective model (for alternative values of a). We will carry out such a comparison
in our empirical analysis.
Example 1 illustrates this nonnestedness result by considering the a-CR condition
for a = 0.9 We believe this case is particularly interesting because it may appear to
some that the collective rationalization condition for a = 0 is empirically equivalent
to the unitary rationalization condition. More precisely, that the constant bargaining
weight implies that we can aggregate the individual preferences into a single utility
function, and, thus, that we obtain a unitary rationalization. Our Example 1 shows
that this reasoning is incorrect. Specifically, it ignores the observed intragroup
allocation that is given by the personalized quantities; this intragroup allocation
implies additional collective restrictions which are not captured by the unitary
rationalization condition.
We emphasize that observing the intragroup allocation (i.e. the set Sco contains
the personalized quantities qmt ) crucially drives this non-nestedness result.
Specifically, the result breaks down if the intragroup allocation is not observed
(i.e. the set of observation is Sun rather than Sco). In this case, the collective
rationality condition would require that there exists at least one specification of the




t þ q2t ¼ qt) such that the correspondingly
defined set f pt; qt; q1t ; q2t
 
; t ¼ 1; . . .; Tg satisfies statement (ii) in Proposition 3.10
One can verify that, for a = 0, this collective rationality condition is exactly
equivalent to the unitary rationality condition.
Example 1 Suppose a first situation with 2 observations and 2 goods. The set Sun
includes the following aggregate quantities and prices
q1 ¼ 2; 1ð Þ0; p1 ¼ 2; 1ð Þ0;
q2 ¼ 1; 2ð Þ0; p2 ¼ 1; 2ð Þ0:
The set Sco additionally contains the personalized quantities
q11 ¼ 2; 0ð Þ0 and q21 ¼ 0; 1ð Þ0;
q12 ¼ 1; 0ð Þ0 and q22 ¼ 0; 2ð Þ0:
Using linear programming it is now easy to verify that the set Sco meets the 0-CR
condition in Proposition 3 while the set Sun does not meet the UR condition in
Proposition 1. Next, suppose a second situation with again 2 goods and 2 obser-
vations. In this case, the set Sun includes
9 Similar (but mathematically less elegant) examples can be constructed to illustrate nonnestedness for
a 6¼ 0:
10 Cherchye et al. (2007, 2011) provide an extensive discussion (including formal statements) of
collective rationality conditions if the intragroup allocation is not observed.
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q1 ¼ 2; 1ð Þ0; p1 ¼ 1; 2ð Þ0;
q2 ¼ 1; 2ð Þ0; p2 ¼ 2; 1ð Þ0;
while the set Sco additionally contains
q11 ¼ 0; 1ð Þ0 and q21 ¼ 2; 0ð Þ0;
q12 ¼ 1; 0ð Þ0 and q22 ¼ 0; 2ð Þ0:
Then one can verify that the set Sun satisfies the UR condition, but the set Sco does
not meet the 0 - CR condition.
As a side result, Example 1 also shows that the within-group income distribution
may remain constant even if the distribution of the bargaining power varies.
Specifically, as we indicated above, the first data set is consistent with a constant
bargaining power of the individual group members in the two choice observations.
However, the relative income share of the two members varies over the two
observations. Similarly, we could construct a data set characterized by a constant
income distribution but a varying bargaining power. This shows that, in general, a
constant income distribution does not imply a constant bargaining power, and vice
versa.
3 Experimental design
Participants in our experiment were 102 undergraduate students (53 women). Ages
ranged from 18 to 25 years (mean value = 21.02; standard deviation = 1.72). As we
wanted to analyze collective choice behavior, both men and women were asked to
sign up for an experimental session together with either a male or a female friend or
a romantic partner. This led to a sample containing four types of dyads, namely,
male dyads or two male friends (12 in total), female dyads or two female friends
(14 in total), mixed dyads or one male and one female friend that do not bound
romantically (13 in total), and romantic dyads or one man and one woman who were
in a romantic relationship together (12 in total).11 Given the small sample sizes for
the different dyad types, we will only report test results for the full sample in what
follows. Test results for specific dyad types are available from the authors upon
request.
Participants were scheduled to come to the laboratory in groups of eight (i.e., four
dyads). Each participant was assigned a seat in a partially enclosed cubicle, and
worked individually for the main part of the session. Dyads were asked to engage in
one experimental task together. Participants were rewarded with money and with a
commodity bundle for their cooperation. Each dyad received money and a
commodity bundle with a combined value of € 20.
Our experiment is similar in design to the one of Harbaugh et al. (2001), who
used a revealed preference methodology to investigate individual rationality for
young children. Upon entering the laboratory, participants were given the
11 Homosexual nor lesbian dyads were included in the study.
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opportunity to taste small quantities of red wine, orange juice, and M&Ms (i.e. a
type of chocolate candy). They were truthfully told that they would be making
consumption decisions with respect to these three commodities later on, and that we
wanted them to familiarize themselves with the commodities. Participants were then
presented with 9 choice problems, i.e. T = 9. Each choice consisted of the three
commodities red wine, orange juice, and M&Ms, i.e. N = 3. We selected these
goods following previous studies that used revealed preference methodology for
analyzing individual rationality (see, for example, Sippel 1997; Harbaugh et al.
2001).
Each choice problem was characterized by a different price regime; the prices of
the three commodities are shown in Table 1. The participants were asked to indicate
how much they wanted to obtain from each commodity, given that the total budget
they could allocate to the three commodities was € 10. In order to avoid
indivisibility issues, we created very small units (i.e. a unit of red wine is 1
centiliter, a unit of orange juice is 3 centiliters, and a unit of M&Ms is 5 grams); in
addition, participants had the option to select non-integer quantities. We note that
the price-income regimes in our experiment imply a high power of our rationality
tests (i.e. a high probability of detecting irrational behavior), essentially because
there is no variation of income (€ 10) but a lot of variation of prices. For example,
Blundell et al. (2003) apply a similar idea in their ‘maximum power sequential path’
procedure for maximizing the power of their nonparametric tests. We will return to
the power of our tests in the next section.
Participants were asked to make the 9 allocation decisions twice: once
individually and once together with their friend. The order in which both sets of
decisions were to be made was counterbalanced: one half of the dyads first made the
decisions individually and only afterwards collectively, whereas the other half of the
dyads first made the decisions collectively and only afterwards individually;
changing the order in this way did not yield significantly different results in terms of
(individual or collective) rationality. Table 2 presents summary information on
the budget shares corresponding with the individuals’ and the dyads’ choices under
the 9 price regimes; this expenditure information also allows for reconstructing the
corresponding (mean) quantities that have been chosen under the different price




Prices are displayed in eurocents
per commodity unit. A unit of
red wine is 1 centiliter, a unit of
orange juice is 3 centiliters, and
a unit of M&Ms is 5 g
Choice problem Wine Orange juice M&Ms
1 8 4 1
2 8 3 2
3 9 3 1
4 1 8 4
5 2 8 3
6 1 9 3
7 4 1 8
8 3 2 8
9 3 1 9
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In case of collective decision-making, participants were asked to indicate for
each of the three commodities which percentage of their demand was intended
for each individual. This provides the personalized quantity information that we use
for the collective rationality tests discussed above.
The decision problems participants were faced with were supposed to mimic real
life difficulties that both individual consumers and groups often encounter when
having to pick their optimal commodity bundles out of the available budget sets. To
enhance the external validity of our study, participants were told that, when all
experimental sessions were over (maximum two weeks after they participated), they
would actually receive one of the commodity bundles they had put together. They
were also told that they would be informed through E-mail about where and when to
pick it up. For practical reasons, we picked this bundle randomly from the set of
decisions that participants had made collectively (and we thus ignored the
individually chosen bundles), although they were not informed of this beforehand.
The knowledge that each choice ostensibly had the same chance of actually being
implemented was supposed to give economic significance to otherwise merely
hypothetical decisions, thus providing participants with an incentive for making
choices that truly represented their preferences.
As making the allocation decisions required a considerable amount of calculation
(multiplying prices and demand for each commodity and adding up to check






102 individuals 51 dyads
1 Mean 0.310 0.361 0.329 0.261 0.331 0.407
SD 0.296 0.248 0.297 0.291 0.226 0.282
2 Mean 0.299 0.382 0.320 0.261 0.369 0.370
SD 0.292 0.260 0.292 0.303 0.245 0.283
3 Mean 0.261 0.381 0.355 0.211 0.369 0.420
SD 0.289 0.276 0.305 0.271 0.247 0.299
4 Mean 0.457 0.251 0.293 0.432 0.232 0.333
SD 0.354 0.255 0.301 0.360 0.253 0.315
5 Mean 0.421 0.238 0.338 0.392 0.234 0.376
SD 0.323 0.234 0.293 0.329 0.233 0.299
6 Mean 0.454 0.217 0.323 0.440 0.189 0.367
SD 0.346 0.250 0.308 0.367 0.241 0.328
7 Mean 0.307 0.443 0.240 0.289 0.435 0.276
SD 0.315 0.321 0.301 0.303 0.304 0.315
8 Mean 0.344 0.434 0.227 0.316 0.396 0.289
SD 0.303 0.294 0.292 0.308 0.261 0.305
9 Mean 0.340 0.429 0.231 0.329 0.411 0.262
SD 0.318 0.321 0.316 0.332 0.332 0.342
For each choice problem, the table reports the mean budget shares (mean) over all participants (individuals
and dyads), together with the corresponding standard deviations (SD)
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whether the budget is exhausted), participants were encouraged to use a calculator
to check their decisions. Participants could also spend as much time as they liked on
their decisions and were free to compare, reconsider, and correct previous choices.
As such we maximally avoid dynamic and intertemporal issues (such as learning,
punishment strategies, etc.), which falls in line with the static nature of the
collective model under consideration. When the participants felt that the decisions
they had made represented their actual preferences, the experimenter provided them
with the instructions for the next task. In ‘‘Appendix A’’, we include the instructions
that were handed out to the participants.
Before considering our actual test results, it is interesting to have a closer look at
how dyad members shared the income that was given to them. Table 3 provides
results for the 9 choice problems in our experiment. To define the income shares, we
make use of the personalized quantity information that has been reported; using the
notation of Sect. 2, each member m’s income share is defined as p0tq
m
t : Table 3 gives
summary information on income share differences in relative terms, i.e. absolute
differences between individual income shares divided by the total dyad income
ðC=10Þ: It reports mean values, as well as corresponding standard deviations and
maximum values. In addition, for each choice problem, the column ‘equal split’
provides the percentage of dyads that apply equal sharing.
We find that dyads opt for equal sharing in about 30–40% of all choices. This
means that there is an unequal distribution of resources in about two thirds of all
choice situations. We believe this is quite substantial, especially when taking into
account the laboratory nature of our experiment. In fact, in some cases the income
inequality is very large: in one instance, the (maximum) difference between
members’ income shares amount to no less than 80% of total income. Furthermore,
the mean values of relative income differences are rather pronounced and there is
considerable variation across choice observations (see the standard deviations). All
Table 3 Experimental results—income sharing for the 9 choice problems
Choice
problem
Mean SD Maximum Equal split
(percentage)
1 0.126 0.156 0.680 29.41
2 0.119 0.143 0.513 31.37
3 0.105 0.146 0.552 33.33
4 0.135 0.195 0.800 35.29
5 0.090 0.122 0.506 37.25
6 0.106 0.154 0.532 31.37
7 0.076 0.089 0.360 39.22
8 0.079 0.101 0.460 35.29
9 0.079 0.106 0.410 45.10
For each choice problem, the table reports on the income share difference in relative terms (i.e. difference
in income shares in absolute terms, divided by total income) over all dyads. It reports mean values, as
well as corresponding standard deviations (SD) and maximum values. In addition, the table gives the
percentage of dyads that apply equal sharing (for each seperate choice problem); see the column ‘equal
split’
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this makes us believe that this is a useful data set for demonstrating the practical
usefulness of the revealed preference methodology introduced above.
As a concluding remark, we indicate that the original experiment also included
an additional group of dyads that were confronted with almost identical decision
problems (i.e. they had to state their demand for red wine, orange juice, and M&Ms,
given the same relative price variations as presented in Table 1 and a budget of
C= 10), but with the additional option of receiving in cash any amount of the budget
they wanted to in each decision situation; the price of this additional ‘cash’
commodity equals 1 for all choice problems. The test results for this
‘4-commodities’ group of dyads turned out to be qualitatively similar to the results
for the group that did not have the cash option. Therefore, to keep our discussion
compact, we will not incorporate the test results for the 4-commodities group in the
following section. These results are available upon simple request.
In fact, the cash option for the 4-commodities group also served as a validity
check of our experimental design. Specifically, if the dyads found the experiment
not appealing (because of the commodities and/or their prices), then the cashed
amount would equal their total budget in each observation; this would guarantee
that they received the money with certainty. Because participants effectively spent a
large share of their total budget on the three original commodities (rather than
keeping it as cash), we conclude that our design does pass this validity test.12
4 Test results
We will first report on the rationality of the individual choices. Indeed, individually
rational behavior is a prerequisite for collectively rational behavior. As a result, a
first test for rational collective behavior is whether the unitary model (which
assumes a single decision maker) adequately describes the observed individual
choice behavior. Subsequently, we will consider the empirical goodness-of-fit of the
unitary model for describing the collective choices. This will set the benchmark for
the collective consumption model, which will be considered in the last section.
We will consider the goodness-of-fit as well as the discriminatory power of all
models under evaluation. We believe both aspects are important when comparing
the empirical performance of alternative consumption models. In particular, we
address the adequacy of different models by following the proposal of Beatty and
Crawford (2011). These authors propose a ‘predictive success’ measure to evaluate
the overall empirical performance of specific behavioral models in the context of
revealed preference analysis.
More specifically, Beatty and Crawford’s measure of predictive success
simultaneously accounts for the two empirical performance aspects mentioned
above. Goodness-of-fit (‘fit’) is measured as the percentage of study subjects
(individuals or groups) passing the rationality test for the model under study. Next,
discriminatory power (‘power’) is measured as the probability that the test detects
12 On average, participants spent 65% of their total budget on the three commodities, with a standard
deviation of 27%.
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behavior that is irrational; to compute this power, we will model irrational behavior
as random behavior (see below). Fit and power values lie between 0 and 1.
Predictive success is then defined as
predictive success = power  ð1  fitÞ:
The value of this measure always lies between -1 and 1. A value close to 1
indicates a model with approximately 100% power and 100% fit, i.e. the best
possible scenario. This means that (almost) all data pass the rationality test, even
though the test effectively detects (almost) any deviating (i.e. random or irrational)
behavior. By contrast, a value close to -1 implies a model with approximately 0%
power and 0% fit, i.e. the worst possible scenario. In this case, the test effectively
allows for (almost) any observed behavior and yet the data fail to pass. Finally,
a value of 0 corresponds to a model with a rejection rate for the observed behavior
(= 1 - fit) that exactly equals the expected rejection rate if behavior were random
(= power). Essentially, this means that the rationality test does not allow for
distinguishing observed behavior from random behavior. We believe this 0 value
provides a useful benchmark value. A ‘good’ model must at least have a predictive
success rate that is positive. In general, a higher predictive success rate reveals a
better empirical performance of a given model.
At this point, it is worth indicating that the predictive success measure defined
above actually assigns an equal weight to discriminatory power and goodness-of-fit.
This equal weighting may seem arbitrary to some. Interestingly, however, Beatty
and Crawford (2011) show that this weighting scheme has an interesting axiomatic
characterization.13 We believe this provides a convincing theoretical foundation for
our focus on the (equally weighted) predictive success measure as it was originally
presented by Beatty and Crawford.
4.1 Individual rationality test
To set the stage, we discuss the test results for individual rationality, based on the
rationality condition in Proposition 1. As explained before, we account for
optimization error by focusing on the extended version of the Afriat inequalities in
(3). In these inequalities, lower values of e account for greater optimization error. In
our application, we consider the models with e = 1 (‘100% optimization’), 0.975
(‘97.5% optimization’) and 0.95 (‘95% optimization’).
Table 4 presents the results. Let us first consider the goodness-of-fit values for
the three models that we consider. We find that all models provide an adequate
description of observed behavior. Not surprisingly, lower values for e imply higher
pass rates. But even the 100% optimization model does rationalize the behavior of
slightly more than 90% of the individuals under consideration. The fit of the other
models amounts to approximately 100%. These results are consistent with those of
13 Specifically, by using an original theorem of Selten (1991), Beatty and Crawford (2011) show that
their (equally weighted) predictive success measure can be characterized by three axioms: monotonicity,
equivalence and aggregability. For brevity, we do not give a formal definition of these axioms here, but
refer to the study of Beatty and Crawford for a detailed discussion. These authors also provide an intuitive
explanation/motivation for these axioms in a revealed preference setting such as ours.
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other, similar experiments on individual rationality (e.g. Harbaugh et al. 2001;
Andreoni and Miller 2002).
Let us then consider power. As indicated above, we measure power as the
probability of detecting random behavior. We model random behavior using the
bootstrap method for panel data as described by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
applied by Harbaugh et al. (2001) within a similar experimental context.14 The
method essentially mimics random behavior for each price regime (or budget) by
drawing randomly from the observed set of choices under that price regime (i.e. 102
choices under 9 different price regimes). This gives information on the expected
distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating information on
the participants’ actual choices. All bootstrap results reported in this paper are based
on Monte Carlo-type simulations that include 50,000 iterations.
Table 4 shows that random behavior leads to rejections of the 100% optimization
model in 82% of the cases. This confirms that our experimental design leads to a
powerful test of the model. Power decreases rather drastically when e decreases. For
example, the 95% optimization model rejects rationality of random behavior in only
about 60% of the cases.
Finally, Table 4 gives the predictive success rates for the three individual
rationality models that we consider. All models have a predictive success rate that is
substantially above 0, which is comforting. Next, we find that the 100%
optimization model substantially outperforms the 97.5 and 95% optimization
models. The explanation is that discriminatory power is substantially higher for the
former model than for the latter two models, even though the goodness-of-fit results
show an (albeit much less pronounced) opposite pattern.
Our overall conclusion is that the individual rationality model cannot be
rejected for our specific choice setting. The ‘best’ model is the 100% optimization
model, which has a predictive success rate of about 75%. Next, on the basis of the
results in Table 4, we can reasonably assume that participants in our experiment
satisfy individual rationality. This provides a useful motivation for our following





102 individuals in total
e = 1 e = 0.975 e = 0.95
Fit 92.16 99.02 99.02
Power 82.00 65.86 59.69
Predictive success 74.16 64.88 58.71
14 This bootstrap method is similar to the randomization method proposed by Bronars (1987), which has
also been used frequently in the literature. The mere difference is that ‘random’ choices (for each price
regime) are drawn from the observed distribution whereas Bronars randomly draws from the uniform
distribution (which may significantly differ from the observed distribution). We refer to Andreoni and
Harbaugh (2006) for a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative randomization
procedures, and corresponding power measures, that have been used within a nonparametric context.
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4.2 Unitary rationality test for dyads
We first study rationality of collective choices in terms of the unitary model. Like
before, we consider the condition in Proposition 1, and account for optimization
error by focusing on the Afriat inequalities in (3); we again use e = 1 (‘100%
optimization’), 0.975 (‘97.5% optimization’) and 0.95 (‘95% optimization’). We
compute the power of the different models by using a similar bootstrap method as
before. The only difference is that, for each price regime, we now mimic random
behavior by drawing randomly from the observed 51 collective choices.
Table 5 reports our findings. Overall, these results are closely similar to the ones
in Table 4. First, goodness-of-fit is rather high for the three model specifications.
Next, power is substantial for the 100% optimization model, but decreases
considerably for the 97.5 and 95% optimization models. All this yields that the
100% optimization model has the best predictive success rate and, thus, can be
regarded as the ‘best’ unitary model for describing the observed collective behavior.
We conclude that the unitary model does a good job in describing observed dyad
behavior in our experiment. For example, the predictive success rate of the 100%
optimization model is about 72%. Next, we compare the empirical performance of
this model with the one of the collective model with varying bargaining weight
restrictions.
4.3 Collective rationality test for dyads
Let us then consider the empirical performance of the collective model. As an
introductory note, we recall that our results for the individual choices provide do not
reject the hypothesis of individual rational behavior (see our discussion of Table 4).
This suggests that we can safely maintain individual rationality as an assumption in
our following tests of collective rationality. Following this interpretation, the
collective rationality test results can thus be seen as checking the validity of the
Pareto efficiency hypothesis for the group (in casu dyad) decision process. As
discussed above, Pareto efficiency is effectively the distinguishing hypothesis of the
collective consumption model.
We test the collective rationality condition in Proposition 3 for the observed dyad
choices; and we study varying restrictions for the bargaining weights by considering
multiple values for a situated between 0 and arbitrarily large (or free; see Table 6).
We recall that a = 0 corresponds to the collective model with constant bargaining
weights; while a = free implies no weight restriction at all (i.e. the conditions in
Propositions 2 and 3 coincide). Generally, lower values for a correspond to stronger
weight restrictions (see Definition 3). Next, we again account for optimization error
Table 5 Unitary rationality—
pass rate, power and predictive
success
51 dyads in total
e = 1 e = 0.975 e = 0.95
Fit 90.20 98.04 100.00
Power 82.13 63.17 56.53
Predictive success 72.33 61.21 56.53





e = 1 e = 0.975 e = 0.95
a = 0
Fit 62.75 92.16 98.04
Power 97.42 93.16 88.43
Predictive success 60.17 85.32 86.47
a = 0.1
Fit 64.71 96.08 98.04
Power 96.67 92.36 87.71
Predictive success 61.38 88.44 85.75
a = 0.2
Fit 70.59 96.08 98.04
Power 96.05 91.65 86.87
Predictive success 66.64 87.73 84.91
a = 0.3
Fit 74.51 96.08 100.00
Power 95.50 91.16 86.41
Predictive success 70.01 87.24 86.41
a = 0.4
Fit 78.43 96.08 100.00
Power 95.18 90.69 85.93
Predictive success 73.61 86.77 85.93
a = 0.5
Fit 78.43 96.08 100.00
Power 94.73 90.29 85.15
Predictive success 73.16 86.37 85.15
a = 1
Fit 82.35 98.04 100.00
Power 93.68 89.06 83.60
Predictive success 76.03 87.10 83.60
a = 2
Fit 84.31 98.04 100.00
Power 92.79 87.36 82.25
Predictive success 77.10 85.40 82.25
a = 4
Fit 84.31 98.04 100.00
Power 92.15 86.49 81.38
Predictive success 76.46 84.53 89.38
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by using the Afriat inequalities in (7) with e = 1 (‘100% optimization’), 0.975
(‘97.5% optimization’) and 0.95 (‘95% optimization’). Finally, power is measured
in the same way as for the unitary model.
Table 6 presents our results. We first consider goodness-of-fit. The model’s
goodness-of-fit increases substantially when allowing for some optimization error.
For all values of a, the 97.5% optimization model significantly outperforms the 100%
optimization model: the former model has a fit above 90% (and often close to 100%) for
any specification of a, while the fit of the latter model varies between 62 and 85%
(depending on a). Next, we find that the 95% optimization model (only) slightly
improves upon the 97.5% optimization model, which is obvious given that the latter has
already a fit above 90%. Lastly, we observe that goodness-of-fit improves for higher a.
This is not unexpected as higher values for a imply less stringent empirical restrictions.
As for power, we find that all models perform reasonably well. As expected,
power decreases with the value of e. However, this power decrease as a function of e
is generally less pronounced than for the unitary model (compare with Table 5). We
also observe that power decreases when a increases, which is again not surprising.
Interestingly, for all values of e the discriminatory power of the collective model
(for any value of a) substantially exceeds the power for the unitary model. This is
due to the experimental design that allows us to observe the personalized quantities.
In our opinion, this suggests the empirical usefulness of our methodology to assess
several specifications of the collective consumption model by means of experi-
mental data. Such an assessment effectively allows us to meaningfully analyze the
empirical validity of the different models.
Next, a most notable observation is that many specifications of the collective model
(often substantially) outperform the ‘best’ unitary model in terms of predictive success.
A lot of specifications have a predictive success of no less than 85%. Generally, our
results suggest that the ‘best’ specifications of the collective model allow for a limited
variation of the bargaining weights (i.e. low value for a) in combination with a small
optimization error (i.e. e = 0.975). These specifications systematically combine a high
fit value (about 95%) with a high power value (about 90%). In our view, these favorable
results for specifications with restricted (but not constant) bargaining weights are
particularly appealing. Indeed, as we discussed in the introductory section, such
specifications may effectively provide a more realistic description of group consump-
tion behavior than the model specification that does not include such restrictions.
As a final exercise, we have investigated the possible impact of some specific
dyad features on our collective rationality results. Specifically, we conducted an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) that included the following information for the
participants in our experiment: duration of the period (months) that friends/partners
Table 6 continued
51 dyads in total
e = 1 e = 0.975 e = 0.95
a = free
Fit 84.31 98.04 100.00
Power 91.04 84.95 80.00
Predictive success 75.35 82.99 80.00
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know each other, different indicators of the degree of friendship, and alternative
variables capturing the way in which friends/partners interact with each other.
However, we did not detect any significant effects. A possible explanation may be
the rather small size of our sample.
4.4 Towards household consumption data
Next, we examine the relevance of our findings for the analysis of household
consumption behavior. Our study provides a useful complement of existing studies
that assess the empirical validity of the collective model by using a parametric
specification and/or ‘real life’ data. Deviating from these studies, we address the
same question by using nonparametric (revealed preference) analytical tools in
combination with experimental data. As such, our tests are ‘pure’ in that they avoid
(1) a (non-verifiable) parametric structure that is imposed on the model, and (2)
preference homogeneity assumptions and data measurement problems that are
specific to ‘real life’ data.
We recall from our discussion in Sect. 2 that our analysis has focused on the
egoistic model, in which each member’s utility function only depends on the own
private consumption (excluding consumption externalities and public consumption).
The reason is that empirical applications of the collective model based on real life
data mostly assume this model. In this respect, we note that our first experimental
test involved an unsophisticated consumption setting, with a very limited number of
commodities and a low budget. Interestingly, our findings suggest that the egoistic
model effectively constitutes a useful tool for describing collective choice behavior
in such a simple setting: we obtain reasonably high predictive success rates for
collective rationality models that allow for a limited variation of the bargaining
weights. This can be seen as a minimal validity check for using the egoistic model
in more sophisticated (real life) settings. Of course, the nature of our experiment
only allows us to draw suggestive conclusions in this respect.
One final remark applies to using the newly proposed bargaining weight
restrictions in the context of household data. It follows from our discussion in Sect.
2 that the practical application of such restrictions (through linear programming)
actually requires that the personalized consumption quantities (qmt for each member
m) are observed.15 This may be problematic in a household context: we argued in
the Sect. 1 that household data sets usually only contain information on the
aggregate household consumption and not on the individual consumption. In this
respect, however, we must add that data sets with personalized quantity information
are increasingly available in the literature (see, for example, Bonke and Browning
2006; Browning and Gørtz 2006; Cherchye et al. 2010b). For such data sets our
methodology is directly applicable, which may thus obtain a vigorous revealed
preference analysis of household consumption behavior in terms of the collective
model.
15 More precisely, we can verify that the Afriat inequalities in Propositions 2 and 3 become nonlinear in
unobservables if such personalized quantity information is not observed (i.e. the set of observation is Sun
rather than Sco). And it is well-known that checking such nonlinear conditions is generally difficult.
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5 Summary and conclusion
We have provided a first revealed preference test of the collective consumption
model on the basis of experimental data. By using revealed preference methodology
and experimental data, we avoid the usual problems associated with parametric tests
(e.g. non-verifiable parametric structure) and the use of ‘real life’ data sets (e.g.
preference heterogeneity). We have proposed a testing methodology that allows us
to restrict the variation of the bargaining weights across choice observations in the
revealed preference analysis.
Our empirical analysis has focused on the goodness-of-fit as well as on the
discriminatory power of the unitary model and alternative specifications of the
collective model (with varying bargaining weight restrictions). Adopting a recent
proposal of Beatty and Crawford (2011), we have used a ‘predictive success’
measure to evaluate the overall empirical performance of a specific behavioral
model. This measure also enabled us to compare this empirical performance for
alternative model specifications.
Our results indicate that including bargaining weight restrictions may (often
substantially) increase the discriminatory power of the revealed preference tests. In
our opinion, this is a most interesting observation, as low power is a frequently cited
concern for revealed preference analysis. Bargaining weight restrictions imply
additional structure for the decision process that can easily be motivated on a priori
grounds. Indeed, as indicated in the Introduction, it often seems reasonable to
consider very large bargaining power shifts as unrealistic. As such, we believe our
methodology to restrict bargaining weight variation provides a natural way to
increase the power of the revealed preference analysis of collective consumption
models.
At a more specific level, our results suggest that the choices made in our
experiment are best described by a collective model that allows for a limited
variation of the bargaining weights. This model specification has higher predictive
success than the specification with constant bargaining weights and the specification
with unlimited variation of the bargaining weights. In our opinion, this is a useful
finding as the model with restricted (but not constant) bargaining weights may
effectively be considered as a realistic model of group consumption behavior.
Interestingly, this collective model also outperforms the unitary model in terms of
predictive success. In particular, the model is characterized by substantially more
discriminatory power than the unitary model, while the difference in terms of
goodness-of-fit is much less pronounced.
At a more general level, our analysis provides further empirical support for
considering non-unitary models to describe the behavior of multi-person groups
(such as households). In particular, they motivate the use of group consumption
models that explicitly recognize the individual preferences within the group. Next,
our study demonstrates the usefulness of experimental analysis of group consump-
tion behavior. In particular, such an analysis easily allows for obtaining information
on consumption quantities for the individual group members, which enhances the
power of the analysis.
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As for follow-up research, we believe future work may fruitfully focus on the
experimental analysis of group consumption processes in more complicated
consumption settings. In this first study, we considered a rather simple choice
setting with only two group members, three commodities and a very low joint
budget. It would be interesting to contrast our findings here with test results that
focus on more complicated settings that focus on more group members, many goods
and/or a larger group budget. In doing so, one can also conceive settings that involve
publicly consumed goods. For example, one can then investigate whether group
decisions on these public goods are consistent with the ‘cooperative’ Pareto
efficiency concept or rather the ‘noncooperative’ Nash equilibrium concept.16 In a
similar vein, future experimental studies may focus on consumption externalities
associated with privately consumed quantities.
In this respect, one may also analyze alternative (non-consensual) group
consumption models that account for independent individual decision making (see,
for example, Grossbard-Shechtman 1984, 2003; Grossbard 2010). This would allow
one to assess (and compare) the empirical performance of different models proposed
in the literature on ‘New Home Economics’. We believe that our study illustrates
the potential of using revealed preference methodology in combination with
experimental data for addressing this type of questions, which can provide
additional insight into the appropriate modeling of the consumption behavior of
multi-person groups.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we add the instructions that were given to the participants in the
experiment and that are not explicitly taken up in the main text:
16 Lechene and Preston (2005, 2010) and Browning et al. (2010) provide recent discussions on modeling
noncooperative household consumption behavior, which may imply deviations from Pareto efficiency (in
the case of public goods). Cherchye et al. (2011) established the revealed preference characterization of
the noncooperative model of household consumption.
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Introduction and product-tasting
‘In a moment, you will be asked to make a series of choices regarding the three
products standing on the desk in front of you: wine, orange juice, and M&Ms.
In order to enable you to make these choices in an informed way, you are given
the opportunity to taste these three products (wine, orange juice, and M&Ms) right
now. You can consume everything if you want to.
You will be asked to make the choices partly on your own and partly together
with the person who accompanied you to the lab.
It is in your own and in your joint interest to make these choices as truthfully as
possible, that is, to make the same choices as you would in real life. This is because
one of your choices will be randomly selected for you to take home.
Because of practical reasons, you will not receive your choice right away. You
will however be invited to pick up your choice afterwards. Each choice will consist
of a product package (of wine, orange juice, and M&Ms) that is worth € 10.
Decision-making
‘In the following, you are asked to make a series of choices. Each time, relative
prices of three different products (wine, orange juice, and M&Ms) are given. It is up
to you to decide how much you are willing to spend on each product, given these
relative price variations. Each time, your budget amounts to € 10 or 1,000 euro
cents. Please make each choice as truthfully as possible, that is, as you would in real
life, as one of your choices will be randomly selected for you to take home.
If you want to, you can use the computer’s calculator. You are also free to use the
back of the questionnaire for scrap paper if you want to.’
Appendix B
We only prove Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 2 pertains to a specific case
of the general case considered in Proposition 3.
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Moreover there exists a C 2 Rþ such that Cð1þaÞ  lt Cð1 þ aÞ: Given
concavity, the functions U1, U2 are subdifferentiable, which carries over to their
weighted sum U1 ? ltU
2.17 An optimal solution to the above maximization
problem must therefore satisfy (for gt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
budget constraint)
17 To be precise, -U1, - U2 is convex and therefore subdifferentiable. This, of course, does not affect
our argument.
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U1q1t
 gtpt and ltU2q2t  gtpt;
for Umqmt a subgradient of the function U
m defined for the vector qm and evaluated at
qmt (with m = 1,2). Taking k
1




 k1t pt and U2q2t  k
2
t pt: ð11Þ
Moreover, by construction we have
k1t
k2t
¼ ltC ; which shows that (10) holds.
Next, concavity of the functions U1,U2 implies for each m = 1,2
Um qms






Substituting (11) in (12) and setting U1k ¼ 1C U1 q1k
 
and U2k ¼ U2 q2k
 
with k ¼ s; tð Þ obtains (9), which shows that condition (ii) holds.
(ii) (i). Under condition (ii), for any z1; z2ð Þ such that p0t z1 þ z2ð Þ p0tqt we can
define for all m = 1,2
Um zmð Þ ¼ min
s2 1;...;Tf g
Ums þ kms ðp0szm  p0sqms Þ
 
: ð13Þ
Varian (1982) proves that Um qmt
  ¼ Umt : Next, given lt 2 Rþþ; we have that
U1 z1
 þ ltU2 z2
 U1t þ k1t ðp0tz1  p0tq1t Þ þ lt½U2t þ k2t ðp0tz2  p0tq2t Þ:




 þ ltU1 z1
 U1t þ ltU2t þ k1t ½p0tðz1 þ z2Þp0tðq1t þ q2t Þ:
Since p0t z
1 þ z2ð Þ p0tqt; we thus have
U1 z1
 þ ltU1 z1
 U1t þ ltU2t ¼ U1 q1t
 þ ltU2 q2t
 
;




maximizes U1 z1ð Þ þ ltU2 z2ð Þ subject to
p0t z
1 þ z2ð Þ p0tqt: We conclude that the functions U1,U2 in (13) provide a
collective rationalization of the set Varian (1982) shows that these utility functions
are well-behaved. Moreover, by taking C = 1 we also obtain that (8) is satisfied
since lt ¼ k1t =k2t :
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